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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
REGULATING DEED OF TRUST RECONVEYANCE
FEES
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, approximately 500,000 homes were sold in Cali-
fornia.' The vast majority of these transactions involved fi-
nancing arrangements which utilized some form of security
device. Many of these secured transactions included a recon-
veyance fee as part of the loan processing charges.
In California, a deed'of trust' is the most commonly used
form of security device in real estate transactions. A deed of
trust involves a third-party trustee holding the deed to the
property used as the security for the loan.' When the loan is
repaid or when the lender otherwise notifies the trustee to
reconvey the deed to the borrower, the trustee reconveys the
deed to the borrower.4 In the past, lenders have often charged
the costs of the future reconveyance of the deed at the time
the initial loan was processed rather than when the deed was
actually reconveyed to the borrower. This practice has given
rise to many legal issues concerning the possible conflict be-
tween California laws on this subject and applicable federal
regulations regarding savings and loan associations.5
1. Alisa Samuels, Home Sales Plunge in "89, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1990, at D2.
2. A "deed of trust" is defined as an instiument which takes the place and
serves the use of a mortgage, by which the legal title to real property is placed in
one or more trustees, to secure the repayment of a sum of money or the per-
formance of other conditions. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 414 (6th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter BLACK'S].
The terms "mortgage" and "deed of trust" have come to have synonymous
meanings and will be used interchangeably throughout this comment. See, e.g.,
Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Bentley, 20 P.2d 940, 944 (Cal. 1933)
("At common law and, in fact, in nearly every state in the United States, a deed
of trust, both in legal effect and in theory, is deemed to be a mortgage with a
power of sale, and differs not at all from a mortgage with a power of sale.").
3. Siegel v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 258 Cal. Rptr. 746, 747 (Ct. App.
1989).
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. Federal regulations give the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board "plenary and exclusive authority" to regulate all
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Siegel v. American Savings and Loan Association6 addressed
those legal issues in 1989. In Siegel, California's First District
Court of Appeal held the state's law concerning the regulation
of deed of trust reconveyance fees was not in conflict with the
federal regulation of the field.7 Therefore, the state regulation
was not preempted8 by the federal regulation of the subject.
It is important to note that this decision was rendered by
a state court of appeal and not by the California Supreme
Court. Therefore, the question whether the regulation of deed
of trust reconveyance fees by the state is in conflict with fed-
eral regulation is not yet conclusively resolved in California as
well as in every other jurisdiction in the country.9
This comment addresses the issue of federal preemption
of state law regulating deed of trust reconveyance fees. Section
II first discusses the role of reconveyance fees in real property
secured transactions.' ° Federal regulations and California stat-
utes concerning savings and loan associations and reconvey-
ance fees are summarized." Additionally, Section II explores
the doctrine of federal preemption and the interrelationship of
federal and state regulations. 2 Finally, Section II synopsizes
Siegel and the appellate court's analysis thereof."
Section III describes the problems of federal preemption
of reconveyance fee regulation in relation to the court's de-
aspects of the operations of federal savings associations. The exercise of such
authority by the Board preempts any state law addressing the operations of a
federal savings association. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1990). Additionally, a federal savings
association can require a borrower to pay any necessary initial loan charges, in-
cluding costs incurred by the association in providing incidental services connected
with the borrower's loan. 12 C.F.R. § 545.32(b)(5) (1990).
6. 258 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Ct. App. 1989).
7. The appellate court. reversed the trial court which had held that such a
conflict between the state and federal laws existed. Based upon that conflict, the
trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the suit alleging illegal collection of
reconveyance fees. Id. at 746.
8. See infra notes 58-79 and accompanying text.
9. At this time no other jurisdiction has decided the issue addressed in
Siegel.
10. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 30-57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 58-104 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 105-30 and accompanying text.
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cision in Siegel. 4 Also, this section explains the significance of
the problem. 5
Section IV analyzes Siegel by applying the United States
Supreme Court's preemption test to its facts. 6 This section
also compares Siegel to analogous cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court and the supreme courts of other juris-
dictions.'7 Section V proposes a statutory solution to the is-
sues addressed in Siegel. 8
II. BACKGROUND
A. Role of Reconveyance Fees in Secured Transactions
A deed of trust is a tripartite contract between the lender,
the borrower and the trustee. 9 The trustee holds title to the
property until the loan is repaid.20 At that time, the lender
executes a request for reconveyance which serves to notify the
trustee that the title to the property can be reconveyed to the
borrower.2' After receiving the request for reconveyance, the
trustee executes and records a deed of reconveyance which
officially transfers the hypothecated property2 to the former
borrower. The recording of the deed of reconveyance extin-
guishes the lien on the property created by the deed of
trust.
23
If the deed of trust so provides, a lender may charge the
borrower the costs associated with the future reconveyance of
the deed at the time the loan is originally processed.24 These
costs may include the lender's administrative costs incurred in
reconveying the deed, any applicable trustee's fees and the
recording fees relating to recording the reconveyance. 25 How-
14. See ifra text accompanying notes 112-20.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
16. See infra notes 133-57 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 166-69.




22. Hypothecated property is pledged as security or collateral for a debt.
BLACK'S, supra note 2, at 742.
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ever, if a deed of trust does not provide for the charging of
such fees i n advance, the lender has no right to be reimbursed
for the costs before they are actually incurred.26
B. Federal Regulation of Reconveyance Fees
The history of federal involvement in the regulation of
financial institutions and problems accompanying the interrela-
tionship between state and federal regulatory authority can be
traced to the early history of the United States.2 7 These
problems led to the firm establishment of the country's dual
banking system after the Civil War28 in an attempt to reach a
compromise between the often competing state and federal
interests and to define the precise roles of the two sover-
eigns.2
9
The principal force behind the enactment of the current
regulations was the Great Depression of 1929. In response to
the Great Depression and the accompanying economic devasta-
tion, Congress enacted several important laws during the early
1930's to impose stricter requirements on all financial institu-
tions. These laws also established regulatory agencies to super-
vise the banking and thrift industries and to ensure the
industries' compliance with the laws. The two most important
laws concerning the home loan market were the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act (the Act),"° which established the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), and the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA),3" which provided a wide variety of
restrictions on thrift institutions and federal savings and loan
associations.3 2 The Federal Home Loan Bank Act authorized
the FHLBB to adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry
out the purposes of the Act and provided the means by which
26. Id.
27. James G. Kreissman, Note, Administrative Preemption in Consumer Banking
Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 911, 913 (1987).
28. National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863) and National
Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864). These acts authorized private
national banks to operate under federal, rather than state, charters, thereby es-
tablishing a system of dual regulation by both the states' and federal governments,
i.e. a dual banking system.
29. Kreissman, supin note 27, at 914.
30. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1988).
31. Id. §§ 1461-1470.
32. See, e.g., id. § 1464.
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the Act is enforced."3 Since the Act's passage, many FHLBB
rules and regulations have been promulgated pursuant to it.3 4
A review of these numerous regulations is beyond the scope of
this comment. However, there are three regulations which
directly impact the analysis of the preemption issue. These
regulations specifically address preemption, 5  real estate
loans3 6 and home loans.3 7
33. Id. § 1437(a) (repealed 1989). See generally supra note 30 (this section pro-
vides the powers and duties of the FHLBB).
34. In the years since both the Federal Home Loan Bank Act and the Home
Owners' Loan Act were enacted, courts and commentators have interpreted their
purposes in many various ways. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Elbert,
337 N.E.2d 420, 424 (I1. App. Ct. 1975) ("The primary purpose of the [Home
Owners' Loan] Act was to prevent violations of law and unsound practices which
'might adversely affect the Nation's financial institutions, with resulting harmful
consequences to the growth and development of the Nation's economy'" (quoting
S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966), repinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3532, 3533)); Turtle Mountain Supply Co. v. Krieg, 7 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1943)
("The Home Owners' Loan Act was intended 'to provide emergency relief with
respect to home mortgage indebtedness, to refinance home mortgages,' and 'to
extend relief to owners who occupied their own homes and who were unable to
amortize their debts elsewhere.'" (quoting 12 U.S.C.A. § 1461- 1470 (West 1933)));
McAllister v. Drapeau, 92 P.2d 911, 915 (Cal. 1939) ("[T]he main and controlling
purpose of the [A]ct was to assist small home owners who, because of the then
existing financial conditions, faced loss of their homes through inability to meet
the charges due on mortgages .... "); Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v.
Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), summarily affid 445 U.S. 921 (1980)
(Congress intended to use the FHLBB rules and regulations as an example for
uniform savings and loan regulations in hope of obviating the "hodgepodge" of
laws and regulations the states had developed (citing THoMAS B. MARVELL, THE
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 26 (1969)).
35. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1991), which provides in full:
The regulations in this part 545 are promulgated pursuant to the
plenary and exclusive authority of the Office to regulate all aspects of
the operations of Federal savings associations, as set forth in section
5(a) of the Act. This exercise of the Office's authority is preemptive
of any state law purporting to address the subject of the operations
of a Federal savings association.
See also infra note 145 and accompanying text.
36. 12 C.F.R. § 545.32 (1991). Subsection (b)(5) provides:
Except as provided in § 563.35(d) of this chapter, a Federal savings
association may require a borrower to pay necessary initial charges
connected with making a loan, including the actual costs of title ex-
amination, appraisal, credit report, survey, drawing of papers, loan
closing, and other necessary incidental services and costs, in such
reasonable amounts as the board of directors may fix. The Federal
savings association may collect the charges from the borrower and pay
the persons rendering services.
See also infra note 146 and accompanying text.
37. 12 C.F.R. § 545.33 (1991) (subsection (f)(3) repealed 1989). Subsection
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First, a close examination of each rule is necessary.
FHLBB Rule 545.28 concerns the preemptive effect of the
FHLBB. It provides that "the exercise of the FHLBB's authori-
ty is preemptive of any state law purporting to address the sub-
ject of the operations of a federal savings and loan associa-
tion.""9
Next, Rule 545.3240 regulates many different aspects of a
real estate loan transaction. Specifically, it permits a savings
and loan association to require a borrower to pay necessary
initial loan charges, including costs incurred by the association
in providing necessary incidental services. 41
Finally, Rule 545.3342 established guidelines which gov-
ern home loan transactions. Before its repeal in 1989, subsec-
tion (f)(3) of this rule required that if a loan contract is to in-
clude escrow payments, a statement explaining the purpose of
the payments, how the amount of the payment is determined
and the association's rights if the borrower fails to make the
payment must be included.43
C. Current California Statutes Concerning Home Loans
The following is a general overview of the current Califor-
nia legislation governing real property secured transactions,
i.e., mortgages and deeds of trust. Special emphasis is given to
those sections regulating reconveyance fees. California's stat-
utes concerning real property secured transactions are located
both in the Code of Civil Procedure 44 and the Civil Code. Al-
(0)(3) provided:
If the loan contract provides for escrow payments, a statement ex-
plaining the purpose of requiring escrow payments, how the amount
of the escrow payment is established, and the rights of the association
if the borrower fails to make the escrow payments.
38. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1991).
39. Id.
40. 1d. § 545.32.
41. Id. § 545.32(b)(5).
42. Id. § 545.33.
43. I. § 545.33(f)(3) (subsection (f)(3) repealed 1989).
44. The California Code of Civil Procedure provides regulations in sections
580(a), 580(h), 580(d) and 726. Section 580(a) establishes a fair value provision to
ensure that a lender does not recoup a double recovery after a non-judicial fore-
closure sale by later collecting a deficiency judgment after purchasing the property
which was the security for the debt at a price price far below its fair market val-
ue. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(a) (Deering Supp. 1991). A deficiency judgment
204 [Vol. 32
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though sections 2920 through 2967"5 of the California Civil
Code expressly regulate mortgages, the focus of this comment
is a detailed examination of section 2941.
Section 2941 of the California Civil Code was extensively
amended in 1988. This section sets forth the state's regulations
concerning the reconveyance of a deed of trust. Subsection (a)
requires the beneficiary/lender or his/her assignee to execute
a certificate of discharge within thirty days of when the deed
of trust is satisfied, i.e., paid in full.46 Subsection (b)(1)(a) re-
quires the reconveyance of the deed of trust to be recorded
within 21 days after the trustee receives the original note and
request for reconveyance from the lender.47 Subsection (d)
imposes a $300.00 fine upon any violator of the statutory pro-
visions set forth in the section.4" A lender who fails to
promptly request the reconveyance or provide the trustee with
the necessary documentation 49 or a trustee who fails to exe-
cute and/or record the reconveyed deed5" shall be subject to
such a fine.
Subsection (e)(1) 5  permits the trustee or beneficia-
is defined as the imposition of personal liability on the borrower for the unpaid
balance of the mortgage debt after a foreclosure sale has failed to yield the full
amount of the debt due. BLACK'S, supra note 2, at 422.
Section 580(b) forbids a deficiency judgment after the foreclosure of real
property secured by a purchase-money mortgage. A purchase-money mortgage is
any mortgage given to secure a loan made for the purpose of acquiring the land
on which the mortgage is given. BLACK'S, supra note 2, at 1235. Section 580(b)
applies to any seller who loans money to the buyer and to a third-party lender
who loans money for the purchase of a one- to-four family residence. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 580(b) (Deering Supp. 1991.).
Section 580(d) bars any deficiency judgment after a non- judicial foreclosure
sale. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (Deering Supp. 1991).
Section 726 provides that there can only be one form of action for the
collection of a debt secured by real property: a foreclosure sale. Also, it provides
a fair value provision sinilar to that of § 580(a). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726
(Deering Supp. 1991).
45. These sections relate to mortgages in general, mortgage foreclosure
consultants, foreclosure procedures and disclosure requirements relating to
purchase-money liens. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2920 (Deering Supp. 1991)
(defining mortgage); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2922 (Deering Supp. 1991) (requiring that
a mortgage be in writing) and CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924.6 (Deering Supp. 1991)
(placing limitations on acceleration of mortgages).
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2941(a) (Deering Supp. 1991).
47. Id. § 294 1(b)(1)(A).
48. Id. § 2941(d).
49. Id. § 2941(b)(1).
50. Id. § 2941(b)(1)(A).
51. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2941(e)(1) provides:
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ry/lender to charge a reasonable fee5" to the trus-
tor/borrower for services involved in preparing the reconvey-
ance, including document preparation, forwarding services and
official fees. The amended subsection also provides that such a
fee may be made payable no earlier than the opening of es-
crow relating to the property being transferred or no later
than 60 days prior to the full satisfaction of the obligation se-
cured by the deed of trust.5 3 This current language was enact-
ed in 1988"4 and amended the former language of this sub-
section. The former language provided that a reconveyance fee
could be made payable in advance of the performance of any
service relating to the reconveyance of the deed, as otherwise
required by section 2941.-
The California legislature intended that the amendments
to section 2941 would become operative on July 1, 1989 and
be applied prospectively only.56 Further, these newly-amended
provisions were not to create any inference concerning the
amount or timing of reconveyance fees charged pursuant to
section 2941 prior to July 1, 1989 or to create such an infer-
ence relating to the timing of requests for, and recordings of,
deed of trust reconveyances prior to July 1, 1989."7
The trustee, beneficiary, or mortgagee may charge a reasonable fee to
tile trustor or mortgagor, or the owner of the land, as the case may
be, for all services involved in the preparation, execution, and recor-
dation of the full reconveyance, including, but not limited to, docu-
ment preparation and forwarding services rendered to effect the full
reconveyance, and, in addition, may collect official fees. This fee may
be made payable no earlier than the opening of a bona fide escrow
or no more than 60 days prior to the full satisfaction of the obliga-
tion secured by the deed of trust or mortgage.
52. California Civil Code section 2941(e)(2) states that until January 1, 1992,
a reconveyance fee which does not exceed sixty-five dollars ($65.00) is presumed
to be reasonable.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 29411(e)(1) (Deering Stipp. 1991).
54. Act of Sept. 20, 1988, ch. 1006, § 1, § 2941(e)(1), 1988 Cal. Legis. Serv.
2415-18 (West 1988) (to be codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 2941).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2941(e) (Deering 1986).
56. Act of September 20, 1988, ch. 1006, § 3, 1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2417
(West 1988).
57. Id. § 4.
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D. The Principle of Federal Preemption
1. General Discussion of the Principle
Federal preemption" involves the conflict between feder-
al law and state or local statutes or regulations. Federal pre-
emption stems from the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution.5 9 Professor Kenneth E. Scott has developed an
analytical model to determine which "pattern of relationship"
exists between a given federal law or regulation and conflicting
state legislation in the field of financial institutions.6" The pat-
tern of relationship will determine which set of laws and regu-
lations apply to a given fact situation. Professor Scott charac-
terizes the possible pattern of relationship between the
co-existing state and federal systems as one of four types:
1) Federal Domination: Federal law occupies the field
and applies to both state and national financial institu-
tions, to the exclusion of, or in the absence of, any state
rule concerning the same matter.
2) Overlay: A financial institution may have to comply
with both federal and state requirements simultaneously.
This is especially likely to occur with state-chartered finan-
cial institutions.
3) Independence: There may be a federal rule that
applies only to federally-chartered financial institutions and
a state rule that applies to state-chartered financial institu-
58. The United States Constitution and acts of Congress have given the
federal government exclusive power over certain matters such as interstate com-
merce and sedition to the exclusion of state jurisdiction. Federal preemption
occurs where federal law so occupies the field that state courts are prevented
from asserting jurisdiction. BLACK'S, supra note 2, at 612 (citing State v. McHorse,
517 P.2d 75, 79 (N.M. 1973).
59. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound there-
by, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.
60. Although Professor Scott's article uses the term "banks," the term "finan-
cial institutions" is substituted here since the same basic scheme of regulation is
imposed on both banks and savings and loan associations and this comment
focuses more towards savings and loan associations. Kenneth E. Scott, The Patch-
work Quilt: State and Federal Roles in Bank Regulation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 687, 688
(1980).
1992]
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tions; thus, there is independence of the two regulatory
systems.
4) State Domination: The state rule governs the mat-
ter for both state- and federally-chartered financial institu-
tions, either by express incorporation in the federal statute
or by federal acquiescence.
6 1
In terms of the patterns of relationships between state
and federal laws and regulations, preemption would be con-
sidered the "federal domination" pattern.6' As such, the fed-
eral law would occupy the field6" and would apply to both
state and federal financial institutions.64
Preemption itself can best be explained through a brief
example. Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Commis-
sion65 involved a California law66 which imposed a moratori-
um on the certification of nuclear power plants until the State
Energy Commission found a demonstrated technology for the
disposal of high-level nuclear waste. Pacific Gas & Electric
(PG&E) sought a declaratory judgment that the moratorium
was preempted by the Federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954.67
The United States Supreme Court held that Congress pre-
served dual regulation of nuclear energy, with the federal gov-
ernment maintaining complete control of the safety aspects of
the industry and the states retaining control over the economic
aspects, as they would over any other source of energy.68 The
Court held that the moratorium's rationale was not safety-
related, but rather was economically-related. Therefore, there
was no conflict between the federal occupation of the field
concerning the safety of nuclear energy and the state regula-
tion concerning the economic aspect of that energy source.
69
The problem of preemption arises when both Congress or
a federal agency and a state legislature enact laws or regula-
tions governing the same conduct which may result in conflict-
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
64. Scott, supra note 60, at 688.
65. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
66. CAL. Puii. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (Deering 1988).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1973).
68. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 211-12
(1983).
69. Id. at 223.
208 [Vol. 32
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ing regulatory standards.7" A state law can be preempted by
federal law either expressly or implicitly. Preemption is com-
pelled whether Congress' intent is explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its purpose.7'
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court, in its decision
of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,72 reaffirmed two situations
where congressional intent to supersede state law can be in-
ferred in the absence of explicit preemptive language. The first
is where the federal regulation of the regulated area is so per-
vasive that it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended
to "occupy the field," thereby leaving no room for the states to
supplement the scheme of federal regulation.7" The second
situation arises when Congress regulates a field where the fed-
eral interest is so dominant that the federal system of regula-
tion precludes the enforcement of state laws concerning the
same subject.74
However, it is also possible for certain aspects of a state
law to be superseded by federal law where Congress has not
entirely displaced the state regulation in a specific area. This
occurs when compliance with both the federal and state laws is
impossible 75 or when the state law stands as an obstacle to
the achievement of congressional objectives in enacting the
federal regulations.76
Two peripheral issues merit mention as they are especially
relevant to this comment. First, the Supreme Court has held
that the principles of preemption are applicable to matters
concerning real property, despite the fact that real property
law is considered a matter of special concern to the states.77
70. A. Mark Segreti, Jr., The Federal Preemption Question-A Federal Question? An
Analysis of Federal Jurisdiction Over Supremacy Clause Issues, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
653 (1984-85). See also supra note 58.
71. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
72. 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (concerning the impact of the United States
Warehouse Act on the power of the states over warehousing practices).
73. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 30 (1947) (citing Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919) and Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1941)).
74. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941)).
75. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 14243 (1963).
76. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
77. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982).
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Secondly, the Supreme Court has held that federal regulations,
for example, the regulations promulgated by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions,7" have no less preemptive effect than do federal stat-
utes.79
2. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De La
Cuesta
The Supreme Court has already addressed preemption in
the area of due-on-sale clauses ° with its 1982 decision in Fi-
delity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De La Cuesta.8' This
case involved a federal preemption issue concerning the regu-
lation of due-on-sale clauses. The central issue in De La Cuesta
was whether the California Supreme Court's decision in
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America8 2 was preempted by a Federal
Home Loan Bank Board regulation." Wellenkamp limited a
lender's right to exercise a due-on-sale clause to situations
where the lender demonstrates that enforcement of the clause
is reasonably necessary to prevent impairment of the security
or a risk of default on the loan by the borrower."' In con-
trast, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regulation did not
require such a demonstration but alternatively provided that a
federal savings and loan association has an unqualified power
to include a due-on-sale clause in its loan instrument.85 The
78. 12 C.F.R. § 545 (1990).
79. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153.
80. A due-on-sale clause is a provision usually found in a note or mortgage
whereby the entire debt becomes immediately due and payable at the lender's
option upon sale of the mortgaged property. BLACK'S, supra note 2, at 500.
81. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 141.
82. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(0 (1982) (originally in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6 11(f) (1980)).
84. Wellenkamp, 582 P.2d at 970.
85. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 146-47 (1982) (quoting 12 C.F.R. 545.8-3(f)),
which provides in relevant part:
[A federal savings and loan] association continues to have the power
to include, as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a
provision in its loan instrument whereby the association may, at its
option, declare immediately due and payable stuns secured by the
association's security instrument if all or any part of the real property
securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the
association's prior written consent. Except as [otherwise] provided
in .,. . this section . . . , exercise by the association of such option
(hereafter called a due-on- sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by
210 [Vol. 32
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trial court decided that Wellenkamp was preempted by the
FHLBB regulation and granted Fidelity's motion for summary
judgment. s6 De La Cuesta appealed and the California Court
of Appeal reversed, holding that Wellenkamp controlled and
that federal law did not preempt the state rule. 7
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeal and concluded that the FHLBB's due-on-sale regulation
was intended to preempt conflicting state limitations on the
due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loan associations
and that Wellenkamp created such a conflict." The Court fur-
ther stated that since it had found a conflict to exist between
federal and state law, it need not decide if the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933 or the FHLBB's regulations "occupied the
field" of due-on-sale law or the entire field relating to
federally-chartered savings and loan associations."9
3. Analogous State Court Decisions Concerning Preemption
a. Derenco v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings &
Loan Association
Derenco v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings & Loan Associ-
ation"° was decided by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1978.
This case involved a class action suit concerning the regulation
of the use of monies deposited in reserve accounts.9 Plain-
tiffs sought an accounting of profits which they claimed defen-
dant savings and loan association gained by investing the funds
they deposited with defendant in their loans' reserve ac-
the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies of the
association and borrower shall be fixed and governed by that con-
tract.
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1982).
86. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n was the defendant to the action which
was brought by plaintiff De La Cuesta seeking injunctive relief from a threatened
foreclosure sale following Fidelity's purported exercise of a due-on-sale clause. De
La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 141; De La Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 175
Cal. Rptr. 467 (Ct. App. 1981).
87. De La Cuesta, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467.
88. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159.
89. Id. at 159 n.14.
90. 577 P.2d 477 (Or. 1978).
91. A reserve account allows a borrower to include one- twelfth of the
amount estimated to be required annually for property taxes and insurance with
the borrower's monthly loan payment. Id. at 480.
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counts. 2 Defendant claimed that regulations promulgated by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board9" preempted the Oregon
common law concerning the use of reserve account funds. 4
The trial court ruled against preemption and ordered an ac-
counting. Both parties appealed to the Oregon Supreme
Court.
9 5
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the type of state
regulation sought to be imposed by Oregon, that is, the grant-
ing of an accounting based upon agency and trust principles,
was not preempted by the FHLBB regulations. 6 Further-
more, the court stated it was following the United States Su-
preme Court's tendency to accomodate both federal and state
law, if possible, and that it did not believe the field of savings
and loan associations had been entirely occupied by Congress
or federal regulations since both the Congress and federal
regulators were capable of explicitly stating if they intended to
exclusively occupy the field. 7
b. Kaski v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association
Kaski v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association9"
reached the opposite conclusion of Derenco in a case involving
a similar legal issue. This case concerned the validity of an
interest rate escape clause.99 Plaintiff sought to have the
clause in its mortgage note invalidated because it was uncon-
scionable, vague and indefinite.' 0 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court considered, among other factors, the pervasive scheme
of federal regulation relating to federal savings and loan asso-
ciations and concluded that Congress had completely occupied
this field.' The court stated that the establishment of a fed-
eral system of banking or of lending was of such importance to
92. Id.
93. Id. at 482 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1958) and 12 C.F.R. § 545.6
(1976)).
94. Id. at 481.
95. Id. at 480.
96. Id. at 487.
97. Id. ,I
98. 240 N.W.2d 367 (Wis. 1976).
99. An interest rate escape clause allows the lender to increase the interest
rate of the loan upon advance written notice to the borrower. Id. at 369 n.1.
100. Id.
101. ld. at 372.
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our national life that state laws should not be allowed to inter-
fere.'12 The court remanded the case to the lower court to
be decided in accordance with federal law. 05
4. Summary
The preceding cases and discussion present two points
which influence the analysis of federal preemption issues in-
volving the field of savings and loan associations. First, the
United States Supreme Court and the state supreme courts
apply more than one test in determining whether a federal law
or regulation preempts a state law. In the absence of express
congressional or regulatory agency intent to preempt, courts
must examine the facts of each individual case when rendering
a decision on the preemption issue. Secondly, the two state law
cases summarized in this section illustrate the split among
jurisdictions concerning the occupation of the field' °4 relat-
ing to regulation of savings and loan associations by the
FHLBB. Both of these points are important to remember while
analyzing whether a state law regulating a certain aspect of a
savings and loan's operations is preempted by federal law.
E. Siegel v. American Savings and Loan Association
1. Procedural and Factual Background of Siegel v. American
Savings and Loan Association
Siegel v. American Savings and Loan Association'°5 was de-
cided by the California Court of Appeal, First District, Second
Division in 1989. The case involved a class action suit filed by a
plaintiff class of California residents who owned interests in
real property located within California subject to deeds of trust
held by defendant Citicorp or its predecessor." 6 Plaintiffs
pled twelve causes of action including violation of the
Cartwright Act, °7 civil conspiracy, bad faith denial of con-
102. Id. at 373.
103. Id. at 374.
104. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
105. 258 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Ct. App. 1989).
106. Id. at 747.
107. The Cartwright Act is a California statute that makes unlawful a "trust,"
defined as a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons, firms,
partnerships, corporations or associations of persons to restrict trade, limit produc-
tion, increase or fix prices or prevent competition. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
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tract, unfair competition, breach of contract, fraud and breach
of agency duty. Plaintiffs also sought a constructive trust and
an accounting.'"8
In their complaint, plaintiffs contended that defendant
Citicorp required payment of fees for the reconveyance of the
deeds of trust at the time the loan was initially processed." 9
They further alleged that Citicorp failed to account for the
reconveyance fees when the loans were sold on the secondary
mortgage market."0 As a result of such failure, some plain-
tiffs were forced to pay a second reconveyance fee to the new
lenders who had purchased these mortgages on the secondary
market. "'
Plaintiffs further alleged that Citicorp violated a require-
ment of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA).
The FNMA is one of the principal buyers of pools of loans on
the secondary market. Since 1977, FNMA has required that a
deed of trust securing a loan it purchases must contain a provi-
sion requiring reconveyance of the deed of trust without
charge. By referring to the reconveyance fees under different
names,"12 plaintiffs claimed that Citicorp collected the recon-
veyance fees in violation of the FNMA requirements and the
express agreement not to charge such fees as provided in
Citicorp's FNMA standard form deed of trust."'3
Finally, plaintiffs alleged that Citicorp failed to refund the
prepaid reconveyance fees to the borrowers when the real
property securing the loan was sold, despite the fact that any
subsequent reconveyance would not benefit the original bor-
rower. Plaintiffs claimed Citicorp's failure to so refund the
reconveyance fees violated section 2941(e) of the California
16700-16727 (Deering 1990).
108. Siegel, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
109. Id. at 748.
110. The secondary mortgage market is a mechanism whereby banks, savings
and loan associations and governmental agencies, such as the Federal National
Mortgage Association, pool the negotiable mortgages and deeds of trust they have
in their loan portfolios and sell them to other investors at a discounted rate. This
allows the original lender to receive immediate revenue without waiting many
years for the loan to be repaid. Additionally, it allows the investor to earn a rate
of return which it would otherwise have not received. See WILLIAM H. HIPPAKA &
J.W. PUCH, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE FINANCE 93, 96 (1966).





Civil Code and Citicorp's manner of collecting the fees violat-
ed the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) and Federal Home
Loan Bank Board regulations implementing it." 4
Defendants Citicorp and Citicorp Savings Corporation
demurred to the complaint on the basis that plaintiffs' state
law claims were preempted by federal law provisions in HOLA
and that plaintiffs' federal claims under HOLA were barred by
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which requires a party to
exhaust its administrative remedies with the FHLBB prior to
seeking judicial relief." 5  The trial court sustained
defendants' demurrer." 6 Plaintiffs appealed to the California
Court of Appeal which reversed the trial court by finding that
federal law did not expressly" 7 or implicitly"' preempt
plaintiffs' state law claims and that there was no preemption by
direct conflict between the state and federal law on the sub-
ject. "9 The appellate court also held that plaintiffs did not
have an implied private right of action under HOLA and, thus,
had no administrative remedy to exhaust. Therefore, that as-
pect of defendants' demurrer was also wrongfully sustained by
the trial court 1 2 0
2. Legal Rationale of Siegel v. American Savings and Loan
Association
a. Express Preemption
In finding against preemption, the court held that the
FHLBB regulation concerning the preemptive effect of the
exercise of the FHLBB's authority12 1 did not apply to the
question at issue. The court reasoned the FHLBB had not
exercised its authority by promulgating a specific regulation
concerning reconveyance fees and, therefore, no federal regu-
lation existed to be preempted. 2 2 The court proceeded to
114. Id.
115. Id. at 747.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 748-50.
118. Id. at 750-52.
119. Id. at 752-53.
120. Id. at 754.
121. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1990). See supra notes 35, 38 & 39 and accompanying
text.
122. Siege4 258 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
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declare that the FHLBB regulations concerning initial loan
charges' 23 and the collection of advance payments of taxes
and insurance premiums 124 were not applicable to the case as
neither mentioned reconveyance fees. The court concluded
that it would not find express preemption unless it was clearly
stated in the regulation or if the FHLBB had declared its in-
tent to expressly preempt all state law in that area.
125
b. Implied Preemption
The court disagreed with defendants' "occupation of the
field" argument concerning implied congressional intent to
preempt the field of regulating federal savings and loan associ-
ations. Instead, the court held that the comprehensiveness of
regulation in a given field by itself was not sufficient to estab-
lish implied preemption.' 2' Additionally, the court reasoned
that the United States Supreme Court had limited the applica-
tion of the implied preemption doctrine by narrowly defining
the field preempted.
127
c. Preemption by Conflict Between State and Federal Law
Similar to its express preemption analysis, the court rea-
soned that there could be no conflict between California law
and federal regulations because there was no specific federal
regulation concerning reconveyance fees. Thus, there was no
regulation with which California law could conflict. 12' Addi-
tionally, the court declared the reconveyance fees at issue were
neither initial charges nor advance payments of taxes or insur-
ance premiums. Therefore, the FHLBB regulation was inap-
plicable. 129 In conclusion, the court provided that any such
conflict between state and federal law must be actual and un-
avoidable, not merely possible.3 °
123. 12 C.F.R. § 545.32(b)(5) (1990).
124. 12 C.F.R. § 545.32(b)(6) (1990). See, e.g., supra note 91.
125. Siegel, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50.
126. Id. at 750.
127. ld. at 751 (quoting Derenco v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
577 P.2d 477, 484 (Or. 1978)).
128. Siege4 258 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
129. Id.




The court's decision is seemingly in conflict with the
broad grant of authority Congress gave the FHLBB regarding
regulation of federal savings associations.'3 ' The legal prob-
lem presented by the Siegel decision and addressed in Section
III below arises from this conflict.
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Given the current crisis in the nation's savings and loan
industry, all aspects of this industry will come under increasing
scrutiny and regulation at both the federal and state levels. As
this regulation increases, it becomes more important for the
interrelationships between the federal and state systems to be
as uniform and consistent as possible. Derenco, Kaski and Siegel
are examples of litigation which would not have been neces-
sary if the systems were uniform relative to the specific issues
addressed in each case.
The remainder of this comment will utilize the United
States Supreme Court's conventional tests to analyze the pre-
emption issue relating to the collection of deed of trust recon-
veyance fees addressed in Siegel from a perspective which en-
courages a uniform, efficient and mutually beneficial interrela-
tionship between the federal and state regulatory systems.
IV. ANALYSIS
This comment considers which regulatory system controls
the actions of a savings and loan association concerning the
collection of deed of trust reconveyance fees. The principle
case which resolved this issue in California is Siegel v. American
Savings & Loan Association.3 ' Siegel held that in the absence
of express FHLBB intent to preempt a specific area of a sav-
ings and loan association's operations, the state's regulations
control. This section of the comment will present alternative
arguments to that conclusion.
131. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
132. 258 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Ct. App. 1989). See supra notes 105-31 and accompa-
nying text.
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A. Preemption Analysis
1. Is There a Conflict Between State and Federal Law?
This threshold question concerning the conflict between
the state and federal laws is answered in the affirmative in
either of two situations. First, a conflict is deemed to exist if it
is impossible to concurrently comply with both the federal law
and the state law.' Alternatively, a conflict is found to exist
if the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
a federal purpose.'3 4 In either situation, the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution dictates that the feder-
al law is the "supreme law of the land" and should control.3 5
In Siegel, the court held there was no specific federal regu-
lation concerning the collection of reconveyance fees so there
could be no conflict between the state and federal laws. 3 6 If
the court's conclusion that there is no federal regulation gov-
erning this area is correct, then its holding is valid. However,
an argument can be made that there is a federal regulation
directly on point which would yield a conflict.
Presently, there exists a FHLBB regulation which provides
that an association can require a borrower to pay necessary
initial charges connected with making a loan and other neces-
sary incidental services and costs.3 7 It is reasonable to inter-
pret this regulation to include the charging of the reconvey-
ance fee as a necessary incidental cost because the reconvey-
ance of the deed of trust when the loan is repaid is a prerequi-
site for the loan to be concluded. The charging of such a "nec-
essary incidental cost" is permissible under the regulation.,3 8
Interpreting the FHLBB regulation in such a manner is in
contrast with the interpretation of California Civil Code sec-
tion 2941, which prohibits the collection of a reconveyance fee
up to thirty days or more before the date the loan is repaid.
These differing interpretations would arguably evidence a con-
133. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43.(1963).
134. Hlines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See supra note 59.
136. Siege4 258 Cal. Rptr. 746, 752.




flict between the state law and federal regulation."' 9 This
conflict would exist because it is impossible to comply with
both the federal regulation, which permits charging a recon-
veyance fee at the inception of the loan, and the state law,
which prohibits charging such a fee prior to thirty days before
the loan is due. In that situation, the Constitution's supremacy
clause would apply and the federal regulation would control.
Similarly, the court's interpretation of California Civil
Code section 2941 can be viewed as a hindrance to the accom-
plishment of the federal purpose of the FHLBB in promoting
uniform and consistent laws. 4' Its interpretation contradicts
the FHLBB's allowance of the collection of initial loan charges
that relate to necessary incidental services and costs of the
loan. A state ban on the collection of such costs would present
an obstacle to the federal regulation which permitted their
collection.
The above analysis offers a different, but reasonable, inter-
pretation of the FHLBB regulation which would yield a com-
pletely different result from that in Siegel. It is possible to find
that a conflict exists between the California statute and the
FHLBB regulation both concerning the impossibility of com-
plying with both the law and the regulation and the obstacle
the state law presents to the achievement of the FHLBB's fed-




When Congress' or a federal regulatory agency's intent to
preempt a certain field is explicitly stated in the statute or
regulation, preemption is compelled.14 1 In this case, the
FHLBB does expressly state that the exercise of its authority is
preemptive of any state law purporting to address the subject
of the operations of a federal savings and loan association.143
The Siegel court interpreted this provision very literally when it
held that the FHLBB had not exercised its authority relative to
139. Siege4 258 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
140. See supra note 34.
141. See supra note 34.
142. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
143. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1990).
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reconveyance fees as it had not promulgated a regulation spe-
cifically concerning reconveyance fees.'44
A close examination of the FHLBB regulation concerning
preemption reveals that its first sentence provides that the
Board has plenary and exclusive authority to regulate all as-
pects of the operations of federal savings and loan associa-
tions. 4 5 It is true that there currently is no regulation which
specifically governs reconveyance fees. However, FHLBB regu-
lation 545.32(b)(5)'46 can be interpreted to include reconvey-
ance fees as permissible initial loan charges. It is reasonable to
conclude that the FHLBB has exercised its authority to regu-
late reconveyance fees. This exercise of the FHLBB's authority
certainly makes the FHLBB's expressed intent to preempt,
found in regulation 545.2, applicable. Therefore, it is reason-
able to conclude that express preemption is present and the
state is precluded from regulating the area concerning the
collection of reconveyance fees.
Although the FHLBB's regulations do state that the Board
has the authority to regulate all aspects of the savings and loan
industry, the United States Supreme Court takes a conservative
view in finding such express preemption. Derenco v. Benjamin
Franklin Federal Savings & Loan Association 47 and Kaski v.
First Federal Savings & Loan Association4 8 provide examples
144. Siege 258 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
145. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1990), which provides in full:
The regulations in this Part 545 are promulgated pursuant to the
plenary and exclusive authority of the Office to regulate all aspects of
the operations of Federal savings associations, as set forth in section
5(a) of the Act. This exercise of the Office's authority is preemptive
of any state law purporting to address the subject of the operations
of a Federal savings association.
See also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
146. Siege4 258 Cal. Rptr. at 752. See also supra notes 36, 136 and accompany-
ing text. Subsection (b)(5) provides:
Except as provided in Section 563.35(d) of this chapter, an association
may require a borrower to pay necessary initial charges connected
with making a loan, including the actual costs of title examination,
appraisal, credit report, survey, drawing of papers, loan closing, and
other necessary incidental services and costs, in such reasonable
amounts as the board of directors may fix. The association may col-
lect the charges from the borrower and pay the persons rendering
services.
12 C.F.R. § 545.32(b)(5) (1990).
147. 577 P.2d 477 (Or. 1978). See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
148. 240 N.W.2d 367 (Wis. 1976). See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying
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of how state courts have decided the issue. These cases demon-
strate that some jurisdictions hold that the FHLBB regulations
completely occupy the field of regulation of federal savings
and loan associations while other jurisdictions do not.The
Siegel court correctly concluded that express preemption did
not exist solely because of the general statement in the FHLBB
regulation. However, the argument presented above, which
suggests that regulation 545.32(b)(5) includes reconveyance
fees as permissible loan charges, compels a conclusion that the
FHLBB did exercise its authority relative to reconveyance fees.
3. Implied Preemption
a. Occupation of the Field
Perhaps the strongest argument for preemption in Siegel is
implied preemption. The Supreme Court permits Congress' or
a regulatory agency's intent to supersede state law in the ab-
sence of explicit preemptive language where the federal regula-
tion of the regulated area is so pervasive that it is reasonable
to conclude that the body intended to "occupy the field."'49
This occupation of the field leaves no room for the states to
supplement the scheme of federal regulation in that area. 5 °
The appellate court in Siegel refused to hold that the fed-
eral government exclusively occupied the field relating to reg-
ulating savings and loans. It utilized the argument that the
comprehensiveness of the federal regulations alone was not
sufficient to establish the federal government's intent to implic-
itly preempt the area.' 5 ' However, the court ignored the fact
that in this situation there is the FHLBB's additional expres-
sion of its intent to preempt found in section 545.2 of Title 12
of the Code of Federal Regulations. 5 1 This expression con-
cerning the FHLBB's authority in regulating the savings and
loan industry when combined with the detailed scope of feder-
text.
149. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
150. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comrn'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919) and Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1941)).
151. Siege4 258 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
152. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1990). See supra note 145.
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al regulation which exists in the field leads to a very reasonable
inference of a federal intent to completely occupy the field.
b. Dominant Federal Interest
Alternatively, another situation may arise which can allow
a court to imply preemption by a federal law or regulation. In
this situation, the federal government regulates a field where
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system of
regulation precludes the enforcement of state laws concerning
the same subject. 5 '
The Siegel court also rejected this argument when prof-
fered by defendant Citicorp. The court stated the federal inter-
est in the case was not great since the main actions involved
were for breach of contract and fraud. The court differentiated
between the federal interest present in two cases cited by de-
fendant as precedent and the federal interest present in Siegel.
The court held that the federal interest in the other cases,
which concerned discrimination in real estate sales and ajuris-
dictional question in a common law action, was far greater
than that interest present in Siegel concerning breach of con-
tract and fraud actions.154
It is possible to argue that the court oversimplified the
situation. While Siegel did involve common law claims includ-
ing breach of contract, fraud and breach of agency duty, these
claims do not exist in a vacuum, unaffected by any possible
contrary federal regulations. Rather, it is quite possible that an
applicable federal regulation could in some way affect one or
more of the twelve claims brought by plaintiffs since the
FHLBB regulations are quite comprehensive and far-reaching
in their effect on the savings and loan industry. If any of the
claims were affected by any regulation, the federal interest
would be increased and a finding of implied preemption based
on the dominant federal interest principle would be more
likely.
Additionally, the court based part of its judgment on Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 2941, which prohibits the collection
153. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
154. Siegel, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 750 (citing California v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951) and Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aft', 445 U.S. 921 (1980)).
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of reconveyance fees up to thirty days or more before the date
the loan is repaid.'55 A reasonable interpretation of FHLBB
regulation 545.32(b)(5), permitting the collection of necessary
initial charges connected with making a loan, including those
incurred for necessary incidental services, 156 would conflict
with Civil Code section 2941's prohibition. It is reasonable to
conclude that the potential conflict between a federal regula-
tion and the state statute raises the level of federal interest and
compels a finding of implied preemption based upon the dom-
inant federal interest principle.
Finally, the argument that the federal government and,
more particularly, the FHLBB has a significant interest in the
financial health and well-being of savings and loan associations
is pertinent to this situation. The current crisis in the savings
and loan industry has heightened the FHLBB's interest in con-
trolling home loans. Any judicial decision affecting the federal
government's authority in regulating any savings and loan asso-
ciation now involves an important federal interest.
4. Summary
The previous discussion concerning the preemption issue
addressed in Siegel utilized arguments and interpretations
which the appellate court either rejected or did not consider.
Given the facts of the case before it and the arguably egregious
acts of the defendant savings and loan institution,1 57 the
court may have felt that the more just and equitable decision
was to rule in the manner it did, namely, against preemption
and in favor of the plaintiffs.
However, the court could have reached its decision pursu-
ant to a different theory proffered by the plaintiffs, such as
breach of contract, since twelve causes of action were pled.
158
If the court desired to rule for plaintiffs, the alleged mishan-
155. Id. at 747.
156. 12 C.F.R. § 545.32(b)(5) (1990). See supra note 146.
157. The defendant savings and loan association did not account for the
reconveyance fees paid by the plaintiffs when the loans were sold on the second-
ary market, thus causing the plaintiffs to be charged a second reconveyance fee;
refused to refund the prepaid reconveyance fees when the property was later sold
by the borrower; and circumvented the FNMA requirements of deed reconveyance
without charge by calling the reconveyance fees "trustee's acceptance fees." Siegel
258 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
158. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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dling of the situation159 by the defendant savings and loan
would have supported that result without consideration of the
preemption issue.
It appears that the court may have overreacted in arriving
at its equitable conclusion. While it did reach a reasonable
decision in interpreting the FHLBB regulations, the contrary
argument also possessed merit. This contrary position suggest-
ed that the court did not reasonably interpret the FHLBB
regulations in reaching its conclusion that federal regulations
concerning the collection of reconveyance fees did not exist
and could not be implied to exist despite some arguably clear
language that would allow for such an implication. Once the
court decided there was no specific regulation concerning
reconveyance fees, there could be no preemption of the state
law on the matter of reconveyance fees.
Similar arguments can be made concerning the court's
refusal to apply the express preemption statement at the begin-
ning of the FHLBB regulations to Siegel. As stated above, the
court's decision not to interpret the FHLBB's authority to reg-
ulate all aspects of the savings and loan industry is reasonable
given its reading of that statement. However, a contrary inter-
pretation cannot be considered unreasonable.
B. Comparison of Siegel to De La Cuesta
The defendants in Siegel did not appear rely on De La
Cuesta6 ° in their arguments. Suprisingly, the court relied on
dicta from that case to support its reasoning in rejecting the
"occupation of the field" theory of implied preemption.'
However, De La Cuesta is not a strong a precedent for this
conclusion.
The major difference between the facts of these two cases
is that De La Cuesta involved a FHLBB regulation which includ-
ed a separate preamble stating that the due-on-sale practices of
federal savings and loan associations were governed exclusively
by federal law.6 2 That preamble further stated that a federal
association was not subject to any conflicting state law impos-
159. See supin note 157 and accompanying text.
160. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
161. Siege 258 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
162. 41 Fed. Reg. 18286, 18287 (1976).
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ing different requirements. 163 The reconveyance fee issue ad-
dressed in Siegel did not have its own regulation, let alone a
separate, explicit preamble concerning its preemptive effect.
The existence of the preamble in De La Cuesta is damaging to
the argument concerning express preemption because it can
be stated that if the FHLBB can issue such a proclamation for
one type of regulated issue, it is able to determine what other
issues should similarly have such preemptive effect. Therefore,
those that are not accompanied by such statements are not
intended to be preemptive. The damage of this aspect of De
La Cuesta can be mitigated if the argument concerning the
express preemption of FHLBB regulation 545.2 is accepted
and applied to reconveyance fees.
C. Analysis of California Civil Code Section 2941(e)
No matter which interpretations are given to the FHLBB
regulations, the entire preemption issue is moot unless there is
either a conflict between state law and the federal regulation,
express preemption or implied preemption, i.e., occupation of
the field by the federal government. In Siegel, the appellate
court interpreted California Civil Code section 2941(e) in a
manner which provoked a conflict between the two sets of
laws. The court then held that there could be no conflict be-
cause there was no federal regulation specifically concerning
the collection of reconveyance fees and, therefore, no regula-
tion with which the statute could conflict.
If the court's interpretation of the FHLBB regulations is
accepted and there is no federal regulation concerning the col-
lection of reconveyance fees, then the Civil Code section
would control. However, the court's interpretation of section
2941(e) is questionable. It states that section 2941 does not
allow for the collection of the reconveyance fee up to thirty
days or more before the date the loan is repaid.'64 In effect,
the court ignored the specific language of section 2941(e)
which provides that the trustee or lender may charge a fee to
the borrower for all services rendered in connection with the
preparation and recordation of a reconveyance or request for
reconveyance. More importantly, the statute provides that such
163. Id.
164. Siege4 258 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
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fee may be made payable in advance of the performance of
any services required to reconvey the deed to the borrow-
er.
165
Also, no prior amendment to that statute contained any
language similar to that utilized by the court. In fact, subsec-
tion (e) concerning the collection of reconveyance fees was
added to the statute by the 1978 amendment. 166
The effect of the court's erroneous interpretation on its
ultimate decision may be negligible as the claims for fraud and
breach of contract, among others, were probably valid despite
the savings and loan association's authority to collect the re-
conveyance fees. However, such an interpretation does have an
impact on the preemption analysis the court conducted given
its interpretation of the FHLBB regulations.16 7
V. PROPOSAL
As the previous sections of this comment have illustrated,
the issue addressed in Siegel can be simplified into a rather
basic concept: What regulatory system has ultimate control
over the actions of a savings and loan association concerning
the collection of deed of trust reconveyance fees?
Siegel held that in the absence of express FHLBB intent to
preempt that specific area of a savings and loan association's
operations, the state has the control. This comment has argued
that after a reasonable interpretation of the present FHLBB
regulations, one should conclude that the federal government
has such control, especially in light of the current malaise in
that industry.
However, since Siegel has already been decided, one must
focus on what can be done to avoid a similar problem in the
future. The most effective way to remedy this problem is to
insert express preemptive clauses into the various areas of a
savings and loan operations which are regulated by the
FHLBB. The role of such clauses is evidenced by the impact of
the FHLBB's due-on-sale clause regulation which directly af-
fected the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the feder-
165. CAL. CiV. CODE § 2941(e) (Deering 1986).
166. id. § 294 1.
167. See supra notes 35-37, 121-30 and accompanying text.
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al regulation preempted the California Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Wellenkamp.'68
Such language could be positioned prior to each portion
of the regulation the FHLBB desires to preempt and could
provide:
It was and is the Board's intent to have the collection of
deed of trust reconveyance fees in advance of the actual
reconveyance of the deed as practiced by a federal savings
and loan association governed exclusively by federal law
and this regulation. Federal savings and loan associations
shall be governed and controlled by federal regulations
and shall not be bound by or subject to any conflicting
state law or regulation which imposes different re-
quirements concerning the collection of such reconveyance
fees. No federal savings and loan association may attempt
to avoid the limitations imposed by this regulation on the
ground that such avoidance of limitations is permissible
under a state law or regulation.'69
By implementing such language, the FHLBB would explic-
itly state its intent concerning preemption and any attempted
argument against the effect of the underlying regulation would
be lost based upon an express preemption theory. This pream-
ble to the regulation would facilitate a court's construction of
the regulation. The Supreme Court has held that "deference is
clearly in order" when construing a preamble such as that
recommended here in connection with an underlying regula-
tion. 70
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has examined the narrow issue of whether
state regulation of the collection of deed of trust reconveyance
fees is preempted by Federal Home Loan Bank Board regula-
168. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 158-59
(1982).
169. This proposed preamble is modeled after the preamble found at 41 Fed.
Reg. 18286, 18287 (1976). That preamble introduced the FHLBB regulation for-
merly located at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(0 regarding federal preemption of due-on-sale
clauses, see supra note 80, and set forth in De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 158.
170. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 158 n.13 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,
16 (1965)).
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tions. This topic is important at the present time because it
affects many people in California due to the large number of
residential real estate transactions which occur in that state.
Also, with the current crisis in the savings and loan industry,
increased state and federal regulation is likely and a similar
issue may recur in another state as the quantity of federal reg-
ulation increases.
This comment explored the background of both Califor-
nia and federal regulation in the area, with an emphasis on the
regulation of savings and loan associations. It also examined
the principle of federal preemption and the varieties of the
principle which exist. Most importantly, this comment exam-
ined a recent California case which decided the issue in ques-
tion and analyzed that court's decision in light of several argu-
ments which either were not raised or were prematurely reject-
ed by the court.
Finally, this comment provided a regulatory solution con-
cerning express preemption of specific areas of savings and
loan operations. This solution would simplify such issues which
may arise with the increased regulation and the potential over-
lapping of state and federal regulatory systems.
James D. Ciampa
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